Today’s newspaper articles cover a variety of
topics and come from a number of papers.
The first article is from “The Sydney Morning
Herald” and talks about what it means to be a young girl in rural India.
The second and third articles are from “The
Diplomat” website: one talks about the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) and the
other talks about the continuing border spat with China in the Ladakh region.
Enjoy.
Women persecuted for their phones
Date: July 13, 2013
South Asia correspondent for Fairfax Media
Defiant: Teenager Rakhi ignores the
order in her village banning girls and unmarried women having a mobile phone
and wearing jeans. Photo: Ben Doherty
The telephone was the cause of the
conflict, and a key piece of evidence. In Nawada in Bihar, a man strangled his
20-year-old daughter, before dousing her body in kerosene and burning her,
after he discovered her talking on her mobile to a boy he didn't approve of.
The girl's boyfriend recorded her dying
screams on his phone.
The mobile phone has changed the way
the world talks, but in no place has that change been more confusing and
confronting than in India, where 20million new handsets are bought every month.
In cities, crowded corner shops offer a
staggering array of phones and accessories. In the country, even the lowliest
subsistence farmer has a basic handset, those in any kind of business often
carrying two or three.
Business (busting government
communications monopolies), politics (phones as campaign mobilisers) even
terrorism (bombs set off by SMS) have all been transformed by phones.
But it is in the realm of relationships
- how they are made and fostered in New India - where the phone's impact has
perhaps been most profound.
Cheap to buy, and cheaper still to run,
a mobile phone allows young people, women in particular, to communicate in
private and complete secrecy, with whoever they want, unrestricted by
geography, and outside the reach of their parents, siblings or community
elders.
''In urban centres, especially, women
are feeling empowered through the mobile phone because they are able to
communicate in ways never before possible," says Australian National
University academic Assa Doron, who with Robin Jeffrey is author of The
Great Indian Phone Book, on the transformation the mobile has brought to
India.
"But in the northern areas, like
UP [Uttar Pradesh] and Bihar, the so-called backward areas, you find that the
entry of the mobile phone into the household has been very disruptive … You
have people who have never been able to communicate in a bilateral way,
suddenly able to use this new device, and circumvent all of these structures of
authority."
The response to this upheaval is often
brutal. Honour killings over mobile phones are now so common as to rarely
warrant more than a few lines in the local press.
In June, Meerut man Kishan Singh
stabbed his 24-year-old daughter to death after he caught her talking to a boy
on her phone late at night.
A month earlier, a girl from Bihar was
beaten and imprisoned in a room without food for days by her father who had
found her on the phone. And in January, truck driver Narayan Tomar was killed
by a father furious that Tomar had called his daughter.
In Uttar Pradesh, several khap
panchayats - powerful extra-constitutional community councils, common in
northern India - have decreed that unmarried women are forbidden from carrying
a mobile phone.
There is also formal political support.
Last October, local MP Rajpal Saini said mobile phones caused women to elope.
"There is no need to give phones
to women and children,'' he said. ''It distracts them and is useless. Why do
women need phones?"
In a classroom in the farming town of
Purkazi in the west of Uttar Pradesh, 16-year-old Asma, her younger sister
Reshma, and their friend Shalini talked about the ban.
"[It] has been effective on
everybody, all families, neighbours, feel they must follow it," Shalini
said.
"They [community elders] feel that
by having a mobile, it will cause girls to go down the wrong path, to do the
wrong thing. I don't think it is right. Girls should be treated the same as
boys. A mobile is a requirement of modern life."
Khap panchayat leader Rakesh Tikait
said there was no blanket ban on girls having phones, but that "such
directives may be taken on a village level due to the local context and the
approach of individuals there".
"Our directives are effective
because people have faith in the khap panchayat," he said.
But the founder of the non-government
organisation Asttitwa, Rehana Adib said the bans were symptomatic of a broader
discrimination against women in India.
"Boys are given all the freedoms
and opportunities, while girls are controlled, and suppressed. They are kept
out of education, and stopped from living freely."
Dr Doron said the broader context of
marriage needed to be understood to appreciate "the grave concern of the
elders".
"Marriage in India is not simply
between a man and a woman, it is between families, it's about establishing
networks, establishing business relations, about continuing certain lineages,
about establishing your reputation within a community, and maintaining caste
hierarchies, so having these unmediated channels of communication poses a real
threat."
In a Muslim majority town such as
Purkazi, many families keep purdah. But it has its pockets of resistance.
Sixteen-year-old Rakhi proudly wears
jeans, with their pockets to keep a phone, sitting on the steps of her family's
unfinished home.
She would show off her phone too, but
it had been stolen - presumably by someone who felt she shouldn't have it.
"My own uncles and grandfathers,
and other elders in my family, they put pressure on my family to stop me, my
education, me wearing jeans,'' she said. ''But I have the support of my
parents."
Rakhi wants to be a social worker, to
make it easier for the next generation. "The mindset of the people in the
village here, it suppresses girls as second-class citizens.
''It will change. Women will be given
freedom, but it will take time," Rakhi said.
This article was found at: http://www.theage.com.au/world/women-persecuted-for-their-phones-20130712-2pvk5.html
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The Indian
Foreign Service: Worthy of an Emerging Power?
July 12,
2013
By Sudha
Ramachandran
The IFS
has long been the elite. As India’s global reach grows, it now faces serious
challenges.
India’s
global ambitions have grown remarkably over the past decade. However, questions
are being raised about the capacity of its diplomatic corps to act as an
effective catalyst in India’s transformation to a global power. Analysts are
asking whether the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) has the numerical strength to
project India’s influence in a manner befitting an emerging power. Do its
officers have the expertise to engage in the kind of complex diplomacy that is
required of a global power? Are IFS officers too preoccupied with putting out
fires to spare time for crafting a grand strategy based on a long-term vision?
Several
of the criticisms being hurled at the IFS are not new. The service has grappled
with short staffing, for instance, for decades. Only now, given India’s growing
global stature, have these problems acquired a new significance and resonance.
Part of
the Ministry of External Affairs, the IFS is the permanent bureaucracy
comprising of career diplomats. It works with several other bodies such as the
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the National Security Council (NSC) and so on in
the formulation and implementation of India’s foreign policy.
According
to an official source in the Ministry of External Affairs, India’s diplomatic
corps consists of around 1,750 officers, which includes roughly 750 IFS Grade-A
officers, 250 IFS Grade-B personnel, military attachés, and other officers.
The IFS’ numerical strength is small not only in the
context of India’s geographic size and its 1.1-billion population, but also in
comparison to the diplomatic corps of its counterparts in other countries.
“India is served by the smallest diplomatic corps of any major country, not
just far smaller than the big powers but by comparison with most of the larger
emerging countries,” wrote Shashi Tharoor, a former junior minister in the MEA
(2009-10) and former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his book Pax Indica: India and the World of
the 21st Century (Penguin, 2012).
Indeed,
the IFS is miniscule compared with its U.S. counterpart, and is also far smaller
than the foreign services of countries like China and Brazil.
The IFS’s
short-staffing was identified as a weakness of the Indian foreign policy
establishment in a report prepared by N R Pillai as far back as 1965. This
shortage of personnel is being acutely felt now with India’s growing global
footprint. As the country’s interests and influence extend into more
continents, it needs more diplomatic representation. For instance, Africa and
Latin America are emerging rapidly on India’s radar and while India has
increased the number of missions on those continents, they are inadequate.
The
inadequate number of personnel in the IFS has also expanded the workload of
India’s diplomats. More importantly, as the Naresh Chandra Task Force Report of
2012 pointed out, the IFS doesn't have enough diplomats to “anticipate,
analyze and act on contemporary challenges.” In other words, the IFS is
inadequately equipped to act proactively in response to global challenges.
Recruitment
to the IFS is through competitive examinations held annually. More than 400,000
aspirants take the preliminary exams. Those who qualify go on to take another
round of exams and then an interview. At the end of it all roughly a thousand
are recruited into the IFS, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the Indian
Police Service (IPS), the Indian Revenue Service (IRS), and other agencies.
According
to Tharoor, the former MEA official, 30-35 people are recruited annually into
the IFS, up from around 12 about 30 years ago. In other words, just 0.01% of
those who sit the exam make it to the IFS.
The
competitive exam that is used to recruit India’s diplomats also selects its
domestic bureaucrats, its police and its customs and tax officials. Thus, those
who join the IFS are not necessarily people with the skills or aptitude for a
career in diplomacy.
Until the
1970s, a career in the IFS was much coveted; it attracted the brightest in the
country. Tharoor observes that Indian diplomats have “long enjoyed a justified reputation as among the world’s best in
individual talent and ability.”
However,
there has been a visible decline in the quality of IFS recruits in recent
years. With jobs in the corporate sector paying better and a career in domestic
bureaucracies such as the IAS, IPS and IRS promising more power, the IFS has become
a less attractive option. It no longer attracts the very brightest.
Increasingly, those who join the IFS do so because they did not make the cut to
the other more lucrative services. Several of these younger officers are in
fact not interested in diplomacy and international affairs.
Thus the
impact of understaffing is compounded by the declining quality of its
personnel.
To
address the problem of understaffing of the IFS, the Indian government has
stepped up the numbers being recruited annually. This is expected to double the
service’s strength by the end of the decade, the MEA official said.
Tharoor
is among many who have suggested the lateral entry of experts from other
departments, universities, think tanks and elsewhere. The need for such lateral
recruitment has grown dramatically in recent years. Negotiations on nuclear
liability clause-related issues, space laws, climate change, environment
security, and other areas require considerable expertise in the subject, which
an IFS officer may not have.
However,
the IFS has strongly resisted hiring or even consulting outside experts. In
contrast to the U.S., where foreign policy and area studies experts from
universities and think tanks are often appointed to senior positions in the
State Department and are routinely consulted in policy making, in India the IFS
is loathe to draw on outside talent and expertise.
“They
behave like blue-blooded Brahmins,” who know it all and do not need to draw on
specialists in academia, think tanks or the media, observed Srikanth
Kondapalli, professor in the School of International Studies at New Delhi’s
Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Strongly
refuting this criticism, Tharoor said that where the situation warranted
outside expertise, the IFS doesn’t hesitate to consult. Indeed, experts in
space law and trade issues have been taken on board for short periods. In Sri
Lanka, where India is involved in a big way in construction of houses in the
war-ravaged North, “it is an engineer not a career diplomat who is guiding the
project,” he pointed out.
But such
interaction with non-IFS individuals and institutions is half-hearted, even
superficial. On the rare occasion where accomplished academics or media
professionals were appointed as ambassadors, career diplomats serving under
them were reluctant to share classified information, Kondapalli recalled.
Kondapalli
pointed out that not only is the IFS reluctant to draw on outside talent but
worse, it doesn’t use the in-house talent well either. Those who do not toe the
line are sidelined, he said, adding that “new thinking is not encouraged.”
A far
more serious allegation leveled against the IFS is that it does not engage in
long-term strategic planning, that there is little clarity on goals and how
they could be achieved.
“New
Delhi does very little collective thinking about its long-term foreign policy
goals, since most of the strategic planning that takes place within the
government happens on an individual level,” writes Manjari Chatterjee Miller in
a recent article in Foreign Affairs.
She
argues that as a result of understaffing, IFS officers are compelled to take on
more responsibilities, which means that “besides their advisory role they have
significant leeway in crafting policy.” Miller cites current and former
ambassadors to argue that Delhi provides little input or directions to its
missions. “This lack of top-down instruction means that long-term planning is
virtually impossible,” she concludes.
A senior
serving diplomat told The Diplomat that “while the MEA may not have
released White Papers or other documents explaining government policy, its
statements in Parliament and in the UN or other multilateral settings, public
speeches by senior officials, the MEA’s annual reports, media briefings, all
together give a pretty deep insight into the government’s views and policy on a
range of foreign policy matters and issues.”
“The
overall thrust of foreign policy is well known,” added T P Sreenivasan, a
retired ambassador who put in 37 years of service with the IFS.
Sreenivasn
refuted allegations that ambassadors often work without clear guidelines from
Delhi. “Territorial division heads give directions to the concerned missions,”
he said, stressing that these “guidelines are never unclear.”
Sreenivasan
recalls that the only time during his career when he “had to take policy
decisions without instructions” was during the military coup in Fiji in 1987,
when he was India’s ambassador to Fiji. The Fiji government had cut his
communications and he had to act without instructions from Delhi. “My actions
were ratified by the Government, but with some modifications. These guided me
subsequently,” he recalled.
Sreenivasan
also drew attention to the “continuous flow of instructions and reports between
the MEA and the missions abroad. These constant exchanges” contribute to
“collective decision making” in the MEA, he pointed out dismissing Miller’s
criticism that decision making in the IFS is “individualistic.”
Expanding
on the nature of interactions between heads of missions and divisional heads,
the serving senior diplomat said that these are “routine.” “Such interactions
also take place either in a regional setting or at the annual heads of missions
meeting in New Delhi,” Sreenivasan told The Diplomat, drawing attention
to how these meetings enable diplomats “to interact, discuss and debate a
diverse range of policy issues and matters and, to plan for over the horizon
events.” Similarly, “interactions between the NSA/NSCS, the PMO and the MEA
take place regularly and in both structured and unstructured settings. Where
required, such meetings also take place on a need-to basis,” he pointed out.
As for
the question of autonomy that the missions enjoy, Sreenivasan argues that this
is “confined to making policy recommendations, not decisions or crafting of
policy.” He notes these recommendations are “often accepted by the Government.”
Criticism
of IFS officers being vested with autonomy seems based on a belief that those
on the middle rungs of the hierarchy lack the competence and experience to make
recommendations or decisions. However, Sreenivasan pointed out that this is not
the case in the IFS. “It is at the level of the Joint Secretary and Secretary
that policy is discussed and developed, and annual plans laid down,” he said.
At this level, diplomats have considerable experience in diplomacy; a Joint
Secretary having around 20 years experience in the IFS and a Secretary 30
years. These are not novices “ignorant of the nuances of policy making, but
officers who are chosen with great care and who bring with them substantial and
wide-ranging global experience in a variety of stations.”
It is
evident that while some of the major criticisms that are leveled against the
IFS are rather exaggerated, the IFS does have some serious shortcomings that
need to be dealt with urgently if India is keen to expand its clout on global
issues.
The
problem of understaffing is not one to be brushed aside. While India has begun recruiting more into the IFS, the pace at
which it is doing so is inadequate. It is imperative too that recruitment to
the IFS is done through a separate examination, one that tests knowledge in
international affairs and also aptitude for diplomacy. The current common
examination results in good bureaucrats, not good diplomats joining the IFS.
Two
divisions of the MEA that could contribute significantly to India’s long-term
strategizing are the Policy Planning and Research Division and the Public
Diplomacy.
These
need to be strengthened.
There is
an urgent need for the IFS to step out of its ivory tower. It needs to become
more consultative and engage more with outside experts and institutions. As for
think tanks and universities, they need to produce more work that is
policy-oriented, if they want their input to be taken seriously by the MEA.
Photo
Credit: markhillary via Flickr
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China & India: All Not Quiet on the Western Front
By
Pratyush
July 12,
2013
Reports
of a fresh Chinese incursion in India’s Ladakh region surfaced in the first
week of July, barely two months after a tense border face-off in mid-April when
a Chinese platoon set up camp about 19 km inside Indian territory. Reports of
the latest incursion, which took place on June 17, came three days after the
July 5-6 visit of the Indian
Defence
Minister A.K. Antony to China.
According
to reports, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) patrol in the Chumar sector of
southern Ladakh smashed Indian bunkers on June 17 and took away a camera placed on the ground, about 6
km ahead of an Indian Army post. The camera was ostensibly installed by the
Indian Army to monitor Chinese troop movements along the Line of Actual Control
(LAC), the de-facto border separating Indian-administered Kashmir from the
Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin area.
India
reportedly raised the issue two days after the incident at a border meeting on
June 19. The Chinese returned the non-functional camera in early July. Given
that the reports surfaced three weeks following the incident and going by New
Delhi and Beijing’s attempts to play down the incident, it seems as if the two
countries do not want to see a repeat of the April stand-off.
Reacting
to the incident, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying denied the reports saying, “I have
seen the relevant reports but I am not aware of the specific situation."
She added, “Chinese defence forces have been patrolling along the Chinese side
of the LAC of the China-India border. The general situation in the border areas
is stable. We have the consensus that pending the final settlement of the
boundary question no one of us should change the status quo along the
LAC."
However,
the Indian government’s attempts to play down the situation did not go well
with the opposition, with the Bharatiya Janata Party accusing the government of “suppressing” the information.
In the government’s defense, its response may have been guided by an attempt to
prevent the situation from snowballing into a raging controversy fuelled by
India’s hyper-sensitive media.
Yet the
latest incident is a cause of deep concern and raises serious questions about
China’s intentions. Even more so, since the incident has occurred against a
backdrop of a spate of high-level visits exchanged between the two countries in
recent months, including that of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India in May.
Interestingly, New Delhi and Beijing held the 16th round of their Special
Representatives' talks on the boundary question barely days after the incursion
in the Chumar sector, which focused on devising joint mechanisms to avoid
repetition of a Depsang-like situation.
However,
despite claims by the Chinese interlocutor Yang Jiechi of “breaking new ground”, the two countries seem
nowhere close to resolving the boundary dispute. China’s perceived incursions
also come at a time when Beijing is involved in territorial disputes with
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam – which makes the timing of its
territorial row with India all the more curious.
Whichever
way one looks at them, these incursions do not bode well for Sino-Indian ties
and raise questions about the intentions of the new Chinese dispensation in
Beijing, which seems to be potentially testing the waters before forcing the
border issue with India. They may also shed light on the multiple factors
influencing Chinese decision-making, including domestic constraints and
government-military relations, among others. India would do well to expect and
be prepared for similar border incursions over the coming months – particularly
at a time when the Indian government’s political capital is at its lowest in
the lead-up to the 2014 elections.
One way
India could strengthen its hand in its dealings with China would be by shedding
some of its ambivalence towards the so-called US pivot to Asia and intensifying
its diplomatic engagement with other Asian partners like Japan, South Korea,
Thailand and Vietnam.
Image
credit: Flickr (94142146@N05)
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