Today’s newspaper articles cover a variety of topics and come from a number of papers.
The first article is from “The Sydney Morning Herald” and talks about what it means to be a young girl in rural India.
The second and third articles are from “The Diplomat” website: one talks about the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) and the other talks about the continuing border spat with China in the Ladakh region.
Women persecuted for their phones
Date: July 13, 2013
South Asia correspondent for Fairfax Media
Defiant: Teenager Rakhi ignores the order in her village banning girls and unmarried women having a mobile phone and wearing jeans. Photo: Ben Doherty
The telephone was the cause of the conflict, and a key piece of evidence. In Nawada in Bihar, a man strangled his 20-year-old daughter, before dousing her body in kerosene and burning her, after he discovered her talking on her mobile to a boy he didn't approve of.
The girl's boyfriend recorded her dying screams on his phone.
The mobile phone has changed the way the world talks, but in no place has that change been more confusing and confronting than in India, where 20million new handsets are bought every month.
In cities, crowded corner shops offer a staggering array of phones and accessories. In the country, even the lowliest subsistence farmer has a basic handset, those in any kind of business often carrying two or three.
Business (busting government communications monopolies), politics (phones as campaign mobilisers) even terrorism (bombs set off by SMS) have all been transformed by phones.
But it is in the realm of relationships - how they are made and fostered in New India - where the phone's impact has perhaps been most profound.
Cheap to buy, and cheaper still to run, a mobile phone allows young people, women in particular, to communicate in private and complete secrecy, with whoever they want, unrestricted by geography, and outside the reach of their parents, siblings or community elders.
''In urban centres, especially, women are feeling empowered through the mobile phone because they are able to communicate in ways never before possible," says Australian National University academic Assa Doron, who with Robin Jeffrey is author of The Great Indian Phone Book, on the transformation the mobile has brought to India.
"But in the northern areas, like UP [Uttar Pradesh] and Bihar, the so-called backward areas, you find that the entry of the mobile phone into the household has been very disruptive … You have people who have never been able to communicate in a bilateral way, suddenly able to use this new device, and circumvent all of these structures of authority."
The response to this upheaval is often brutal. Honour killings over mobile phones are now so common as to rarely warrant more than a few lines in the local press.
In June, Meerut man Kishan Singh stabbed his 24-year-old daughter to death after he caught her talking to a boy on her phone late at night.
A month earlier, a girl from Bihar was beaten and imprisoned in a room without food for days by her father who had found her on the phone. And in January, truck driver Narayan Tomar was killed by a father furious that Tomar had called his daughter.
In Uttar Pradesh, several khap panchayats - powerful extra-constitutional community councils, common in northern India - have decreed that unmarried women are forbidden from carrying a mobile phone.
There is also formal political support. Last October, local MP Rajpal Saini said mobile phones caused women to elope.
"There is no need to give phones to women and children,'' he said. ''It distracts them and is useless. Why do women need phones?"
In a classroom in the farming town of Purkazi in the west of Uttar Pradesh, 16-year-old Asma, her younger sister Reshma, and their friend Shalini talked about the ban.
"[It] has been effective on everybody, all families, neighbours, feel they must follow it," Shalini said.
"They [community elders] feel that by having a mobile, it will cause girls to go down the wrong path, to do the wrong thing. I don't think it is right. Girls should be treated the same as boys. A mobile is a requirement of modern life."
Khap panchayat leader Rakesh Tikait said there was no blanket ban on girls having phones, but that "such directives may be taken on a village level due to the local context and the approach of individuals there".
"Our directives are effective because people have faith in the khap panchayat," he said.
But the founder of the non-government organisation Asttitwa, Rehana Adib said the bans were symptomatic of a broader discrimination against women in India.
"Boys are given all the freedoms and opportunities, while girls are controlled, and suppressed. They are kept out of education, and stopped from living freely."
Dr Doron said the broader context of marriage needed to be understood to appreciate "the grave concern of the elders".
"Marriage in India is not simply between a man and a woman, it is between families, it's about establishing networks, establishing business relations, about continuing certain lineages, about establishing your reputation within a community, and maintaining caste hierarchies, so having these unmediated channels of communication poses a real threat."
In a Muslim majority town such as Purkazi, many families keep purdah. But it has its pockets of resistance.
Sixteen-year-old Rakhi proudly wears jeans, with their pockets to keep a phone, sitting on the steps of her family's unfinished home.
She would show off her phone too, but it had been stolen - presumably by someone who felt she shouldn't have it.
"My own uncles and grandfathers, and other elders in my family, they put pressure on my family to stop me, my education, me wearing jeans,'' she said. ''But I have the support of my parents."
Rakhi wants to be a social worker, to make it easier for the next generation. "The mindset of the people in the village here, it suppresses girls as second-class citizens.
''It will change. Women will be given freedom, but it will take time," Rakhi said.
This article was found at: http://www.theage.com.au/world/women-persecuted-for-their-phones-20130712-2pvk5.html
July 12, 2013
By Sudha Ramachandran
The IFS has long been the elite. As India’s global reach grows, it now faces serious challenges.
India’s global ambitions have grown remarkably over the past decade. However, questions are being raised about the capacity of its diplomatic corps to act as an effective catalyst in India’s transformation to a global power. Analysts are asking whether the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) has the numerical strength to project India’s influence in a manner befitting an emerging power. Do its officers have the expertise to engage in the kind of complex diplomacy that is required of a global power? Are IFS officers too preoccupied with putting out fires to spare time for crafting a grand strategy based on a long-term vision?
Several of the criticisms being hurled at the IFS are not new. The service has grappled with short staffing, for instance, for decades. Only now, given India’s growing global stature, have these problems acquired a new significance and resonance.
Part of the Ministry of External Affairs, the IFS is the permanent bureaucracy comprising of career diplomats. It works with several other bodies such as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the National Security Council (NSC) and so on in the formulation and implementation of India’s foreign policy.
According to an official source in the Ministry of External Affairs, India’s diplomatic corps consists of around 1,750 officers, which includes roughly 750 IFS Grade-A officers, 250 IFS Grade-B personnel, military attachés, and other officers.
The IFS’ numerical strength is small not only in the context of India’s geographic size and its 1.1-billion population, but also in comparison to the diplomatic corps of its counterparts in other countries. “India is served by the smallest diplomatic corps of any major country, not just far smaller than the big powers but by comparison with most of the larger emerging countries,” wrote Shashi Tharoor, a former junior minister in the MEA (2009-10) and former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his book Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century (Penguin, 2012).
Indeed, the IFS is miniscule compared with its U.S. counterpart, and is also far smaller than the foreign services of countries like China and Brazil.
The IFS’s short-staffing was identified as a weakness of the Indian foreign policy establishment in a report prepared by N R Pillai as far back as 1965. This shortage of personnel is being acutely felt now with India’s growing global footprint. As the country’s interests and influence extend into more continents, it needs more diplomatic representation. For instance, Africa and Latin America are emerging rapidly on India’s radar and while India has increased the number of missions on those continents, they are inadequate.
The inadequate number of personnel in the IFS has also expanded the workload of India’s diplomats. More importantly, as the Naresh Chandra Task Force Report of 2012 pointed out, the IFS doesn't have enough diplomats to “anticipate, analyze and act on contemporary challenges.” In other words, the IFS is inadequately equipped to act proactively in response to global challenges.
Recruitment to the IFS is through competitive examinations held annually. More than 400,000 aspirants take the preliminary exams. Those who qualify go on to take another round of exams and then an interview. At the end of it all roughly a thousand are recruited into the IFS, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the Indian Police Service (IPS), the Indian Revenue Service (IRS), and other agencies.
According to Tharoor, the former MEA official, 30-35 people are recruited annually into the IFS, up from around 12 about 30 years ago. In other words, just 0.01% of those who sit the exam make it to the IFS.
The competitive exam that is used to recruit India’s diplomats also selects its domestic bureaucrats, its police and its customs and tax officials. Thus, those who join the IFS are not necessarily people with the skills or aptitude for a career in diplomacy.
Until the 1970s, a career in the IFS was much coveted; it attracted the brightest in the country. Tharoor observes that Indian diplomats have “long enjoyed a justified reputation as among the world’s best in individual talent and ability.”
However, there has been a visible decline in the quality of IFS recruits in recent years. With jobs in the corporate sector paying better and a career in domestic bureaucracies such as the IAS, IPS and IRS promising more power, the IFS has become a less attractive option. It no longer attracts the very brightest. Increasingly, those who join the IFS do so because they did not make the cut to the other more lucrative services. Several of these younger officers are in fact not interested in diplomacy and international affairs.
Thus the impact of understaffing is compounded by the declining quality of its personnel.
To address the problem of understaffing of the IFS, the Indian government has stepped up the numbers being recruited annually. This is expected to double the service’s strength by the end of the decade, the MEA official said.
Tharoor is among many who have suggested the lateral entry of experts from other departments, universities, think tanks and elsewhere. The need for such lateral recruitment has grown dramatically in recent years. Negotiations on nuclear liability clause-related issues, space laws, climate change, environment security, and other areas require considerable expertise in the subject, which an IFS officer may not have.
However, the IFS has strongly resisted hiring or even consulting outside experts. In contrast to the U.S., where foreign policy and area studies experts from universities and think tanks are often appointed to senior positions in the State Department and are routinely consulted in policy making, in India the IFS is loathe to draw on outside talent and expertise.
“They behave like blue-blooded Brahmins,” who know it all and do not need to draw on specialists in academia, think tanks or the media, observed Srikanth Kondapalli, professor in the School of International Studies at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Strongly refuting this criticism, Tharoor said that where the situation warranted outside expertise, the IFS doesn’t hesitate to consult. Indeed, experts in space law and trade issues have been taken on board for short periods. In Sri Lanka, where India is involved in a big way in construction of houses in the war-ravaged North, “it is an engineer not a career diplomat who is guiding the project,” he pointed out.
But such interaction with non-IFS individuals and institutions is half-hearted, even superficial. On the rare occasion where accomplished academics or media professionals were appointed as ambassadors, career diplomats serving under them were reluctant to share classified information, Kondapalli recalled.
Kondapalli pointed out that not only is the IFS reluctant to draw on outside talent but worse, it doesn’t use the in-house talent well either. Those who do not toe the line are sidelined, he said, adding that “new thinking is not encouraged.”
A far more serious allegation leveled against the IFS is that it does not engage in long-term strategic planning, that there is little clarity on goals and how they could be achieved.
“New Delhi does very little collective thinking about its long-term foreign policy goals, since most of the strategic planning that takes place within the government happens on an individual level,” writes Manjari Chatterjee Miller in a recent article in Foreign Affairs.
She argues that as a result of understaffing, IFS officers are compelled to take on more responsibilities, which means that “besides their advisory role they have significant leeway in crafting policy.” Miller cites current and former ambassadors to argue that Delhi provides little input or directions to its missions. “This lack of top-down instruction means that long-term planning is virtually impossible,” she concludes.
A senior serving diplomat told The Diplomat that “while the MEA may not have released White Papers or other documents explaining government policy, its statements in Parliament and in the UN or other multilateral settings, public speeches by senior officials, the MEA’s annual reports, media briefings, all together give a pretty deep insight into the government’s views and policy on a range of foreign policy matters and issues.”
“The overall thrust of foreign policy is well known,” added T P Sreenivasan, a retired ambassador who put in 37 years of service with the IFS.
Sreenivasn refuted allegations that ambassadors often work without clear guidelines from Delhi. “Territorial division heads give directions to the concerned missions,” he said, stressing that these “guidelines are never unclear.”
Sreenivasan recalls that the only time during his career when he “had to take policy decisions without instructions” was during the military coup in Fiji in 1987, when he was India’s ambassador to Fiji. The Fiji government had cut his communications and he had to act without instructions from Delhi. “My actions were ratified by the Government, but with some modifications. These guided me subsequently,” he recalled.
Sreenivasan also drew attention to the “continuous flow of instructions and reports between the MEA and the missions abroad. These constant exchanges” contribute to “collective decision making” in the MEA, he pointed out dismissing Miller’s criticism that decision making in the IFS is “individualistic.”
Expanding on the nature of interactions between heads of missions and divisional heads, the serving senior diplomat said that these are “routine.” “Such interactions also take place either in a regional setting or at the annual heads of missions meeting in New Delhi,” Sreenivasan told The Diplomat, drawing attention to how these meetings enable diplomats “to interact, discuss and debate a diverse range of policy issues and matters and, to plan for over the horizon events.” Similarly, “interactions between the NSA/NSCS, the PMO and the MEA take place regularly and in both structured and unstructured settings. Where required, such meetings also take place on a need-to basis,” he pointed out.
As for the question of autonomy that the missions enjoy, Sreenivasan argues that this is “confined to making policy recommendations, not decisions or crafting of policy.” He notes these recommendations are “often accepted by the Government.”
Criticism of IFS officers being vested with autonomy seems based on a belief that those on the middle rungs of the hierarchy lack the competence and experience to make recommendations or decisions. However, Sreenivasan pointed out that this is not the case in the IFS. “It is at the level of the Joint Secretary and Secretary that policy is discussed and developed, and annual plans laid down,” he said. At this level, diplomats have considerable experience in diplomacy; a Joint Secretary having around 20 years experience in the IFS and a Secretary 30 years. These are not novices “ignorant of the nuances of policy making, but officers who are chosen with great care and who bring with them substantial and wide-ranging global experience in a variety of stations.”
It is evident that while some of the major criticisms that are leveled against the IFS are rather exaggerated, the IFS does have some serious shortcomings that need to be dealt with urgently if India is keen to expand its clout on global issues.
The problem of understaffing is not one to be brushed aside. While India has begun recruiting more into the IFS, the pace at which it is doing so is inadequate. It is imperative too that recruitment to the IFS is done through a separate examination, one that tests knowledge in international affairs and also aptitude for diplomacy. The current common examination results in good bureaucrats, not good diplomats joining the IFS.
Two divisions of the MEA that could contribute significantly to India’s long-term strategizing are the Policy Planning and Research Division and the Public Diplomacy.
These need to be strengthened.
There is an urgent need for the IFS to step out of its ivory tower. It needs to become more consultative and engage more with outside experts and institutions. As for think tanks and universities, they need to produce more work that is policy-oriented, if they want their input to be taken seriously by the MEA.
Photo Credit: markhillary via Flickr
July 12, 2013
Reports of a fresh Chinese incursion in India’s Ladakh region surfaced in the first week of July, barely two months after a tense border face-off in mid-April when a Chinese platoon set up camp about 19 km inside Indian territory. Reports of the latest incursion, which took place on June 17, came three days after the July 5-6 visit of the Indian
Defence Minister A.K. Antony to China.
According to reports, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) patrol in the Chumar sector of southern Ladakh smashed Indian bunkers on June 17 and took away a camera placed on the ground, about 6 km ahead of an Indian Army post. The camera was ostensibly installed by the Indian Army to monitor Chinese troop movements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de-facto border separating Indian-administered Kashmir from the Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin area.
India reportedly raised the issue two days after the incident at a border meeting on June 19. The Chinese returned the non-functional camera in early July. Given that the reports surfaced three weeks following the incident and going by New Delhi and Beijing’s attempts to play down the incident, it seems as if the two countries do not want to see a repeat of the April stand-off.
Reacting to the incident, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying denied the reports saying, “I have seen the relevant reports but I am not aware of the specific situation." She added, “Chinese defence forces have been patrolling along the Chinese side of the LAC of the China-India border. The general situation in the border areas is stable. We have the consensus that pending the final settlement of the boundary question no one of us should change the status quo along the LAC."
However, the Indian government’s attempts to play down the situation did not go well with the opposition, with the Bharatiya Janata Party accusing the government of “suppressing” the information. In the government’s defense, its response may have been guided by an attempt to prevent the situation from snowballing into a raging controversy fuelled by India’s hyper-sensitive media.
Yet the latest incident is a cause of deep concern and raises serious questions about China’s intentions. Even more so, since the incident has occurred against a backdrop of a spate of high-level visits exchanged between the two countries in recent months, including that of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India in May. Interestingly, New Delhi and Beijing held the 16th round of their Special Representatives' talks on the boundary question barely days after the incursion in the Chumar sector, which focused on devising joint mechanisms to avoid repetition of a Depsang-like situation.
However, despite claims by the Chinese interlocutor Yang Jiechi of “breaking new ground”, the two countries seem nowhere close to resolving the boundary dispute. China’s perceived incursions also come at a time when Beijing is involved in territorial disputes with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam – which makes the timing of its territorial row with India all the more curious.
Whichever way one looks at them, these incursions do not bode well for Sino-Indian ties and raise questions about the intentions of the new Chinese dispensation in Beijing, which seems to be potentially testing the waters before forcing the border issue with India. They may also shed light on the multiple factors influencing Chinese decision-making, including domestic constraints and government-military relations, among others. India would do well to expect and be prepared for similar border incursions over the coming months – particularly at a time when the Indian government’s political capital is at its lowest in the lead-up to the 2014 elections.
One way India could strengthen its hand in its dealings with China would be by shedding some of its ambivalence towards the so-called US pivot to Asia and intensifying its diplomatic engagement with other Asian partners like Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam.
Image credit: Flickr (94142146@N05)